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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In November 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with the 
Institut fur Europaishe Politik, organised a workshop on the 
future of European Political Cooperation, attended by scholars, 
politicians, and diplomats. This Working Paper represents a 
compilation of some of the contributions made at this workshop, 
including the keynote paper by Dr. Regelsberger.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
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I. EPC as a central element of Western Europe's external posture
What is the nature of West-European (and in particular the EC 
countries') external relations? Do nation-states and forms of 
traditional diplomacy still dominate the scene or have compe­
tences been transferred to a single (supranational) organ 
acting on behalf of its members? The answer will be: there is 
a complex and even growing network of individual activities 
and common representation,the components of which vary with 
"internal" West European interests and needs as well as 
"external" challenges and developments.
The importance of EPC within this framework of common, coordi­
nated and national steps in foreign policy may be discussed 
differently depending on the observer's perspective (inte- 
grationist view or protagonist of intergovernmentalism).
No one, however, can deny that almost 15 years of consulta­
tions by EC Member States on a wide range of international 
questions and fixed procedures made EPC a central element of 
West European foreign policy making. The cooperation of the 
former six and today ten governments reached a "plateau" of 
common viewpoints and actions which serves national interests 
in an interdependent international system that still leaves room 
for individual foreign policy. Its institu­
tional setting is far more refined than those of other West 
European fora (e.g. Western European Union; Council of Eu­
rope), offering direct and frequent contacts between the ten 
governments and in particular the diplomatic staff both on 
ministeriel and official level.
There is no need to go into the limitations of political co­
operation here (see the contributions of Ph. de Schoutheete and
S. Nuttall in this working paper). Suggestions on how to reach "ex-
21ternal identity" are an essential part of the current debate on 
institutional reforms within European circles. Tendencies towards 
a variable geometry in EPC matters, it seems, will be strengthened soon 
as several EC member governments refuse to follow thos-e partners fa­




























































































Union. Because "speaking with one voice" a Dix and soon a Douze
will prove to be laborious, smaller multilateral groupings but al-
3)so forms of "multiple bilateralism" may grow in importance. In 
any case, EPC will neither substitute individual national foreign 
policies nor particularly stimulate European integration.
— t -
Academics and government officials alike have long followed 
the EC countries' steps towards a coordinated foreign policy 
in terms of EPC's procedures and the outcomes of consultations, 
i.e. without raising the question of the status of EPC in relation 
to other levels and forms of a concerted foreign policy in We­
stern Europe and of the importance of EPC as a means of fo­
reign policy making compared with others as seen from the 
ten capitals . Attention has also been paid to the links bet­
ween EPC and Community structures,which are seen as "bene­
ficial"4  ̂ to European coherence in world politics.
To assess Europe's international role a comprehensive ap­
proach seems to be more promising than an analysis of the dif­
ferent fora at stake in isolation. In this context,the que­
stion of how third countries see "European" foreign policy 
undoubtedly is of major value, as the Ten's weight in the in­
ternational system will largely depend on how third countries 
perceive and evaluate the importance of this new actor. Even 
more so because the distinction between EC, EPC and other 
forms of West European cooperation may be sometimes alien to 
outside observers. Is Europe already perceived as a unity 
in both economic and political terms? To what extent do third 
countries react to EPC and Community structures compared with 
traditional bilateral links to EC Member States? Are they sa­
tisfied with the existing mechanisms for getting in touch with 
the Ten?
Before some patterns of outside perceptions of this "fluid"
5)Europe are presented here (point IV), it might be help­
ful to ask,first of all: what are EPC contacts with third 
countries about? In short (details will be elaborated in 
point III): the answer is at least twofold. Talking about 




























































































* the network of daily "diplomatic trade" between the group 
of EC Member States traditionally represented by the Pre­
sidency (in various formations and on different levels)
and non-EC countries, i.e. the rest of the world. Contacts 
usually take place both in the European capitals and abroad 
on an ad hoc and informal basis;
* the system of more institutionalized forms of contacts bet­
ween the Ten and a selected group of states outside the 
Community borders - originally allied and other "Western 
oriented countries; today the group includes also Third 
World countries and in particular specific groupings
of them. Contacts are organized according to fixed rules 
and at regular intervals.
These categories do not exclude one another but overlap con­
siderably in political practice. This holds also true for the 
relationship between an outside observer and individual EPC 
members. In describing EPC contacts with third countries,, it 
is worth noting that the growing weight of the Ten as an inter­
locutor in world politics did not supersede the traditional 
network of bilateral relations between EC member states and 
third countries. Traditional links and the "new system" of 
EPC's external relations overlap frequently and compete with 
each other due to the interests of the parties concerned. 
Depending on the status an outside observer attributes to a 
certain country within the EPC club, it may well be that he 
addresses first and foremost his individual partner to make 
his voice heard in Europe, regardless of which country holds the 
Presidency. For the analyst it is difficult to assess the im­
portance of this kind of daily and traditional "diplomatic 
trade". No doubt, however, these different forms of informal 
exchanges of views, be it on the level of government officials 
or the political top, also belong to the present feature of 
the Ten's external relations.
As another of EPC's characteristics ,the interrelations with 
the Community's external (economic) relations have to be con­
sidered. In theory and to a certain degree also in practice 




























































































of European foreign policy for some time. Today a pragmatic 
approach is followed, based on the assumption that binding the 
various levels together corresponds much better to the needs 
and expectations of Europe's role in world affairs. In insti­
tutional terms,a single outside representation in cases where 
EC and EPC issues are mixed has become the rule (the so-called 
"tandem" representation or "bicephalous presidency"^. European 
representation in the Euro-Arab Dialogue, partly in the CSCE and 
towards third countries in cases where the Ten decided upon eco­
nomic sanctions may serve to illustrate the pragmatic approach 
of recent years. In a more subtle way, "grey zones" of over­
lappings already belong to daily European reality. EPC contacts 
with third couhtries are multiplied by those taking place in 
the EC framework (e.g. Association or Cooperation Council meet­
ings, existence of diplomatic missions to the EC).
II. Provisions in EPC documents; An evolving system of contacts 
with third countries
The proliferation of EPC1s external relations originates pri­
marily from the outside world. It might be interpreted as a 
sign of the Ten's international weight and their attractive­
ness as a coalition partner. An ever-growing number of third 
countries seems to be interested in being associated with the 
European club. From the perspective of the Ten the question 
becomes pressing which status to attribute to which "client" 
and how to keep EPC efficient, given the limited 
resources at the Ten's disposal. Apart from using means of 
"traditional" diplomacy to make their voice heard towards the 
outside world,the Europeans themselves seldom take the 
initiative to establish specific links with non EPC-members.
At least the basic documents of political cooperation say little 
about how the common positions should be made known outside the 
EC borders. Apart from sporadic information in the annual re­
ports on European Union official documents keep silent about 
the scope of contacts with "privileged" third countries and 



























































































The principles of pragmatism and flexibility led the Foreign 
Ministers of the then Six to present a first report on Poli­
tical Cooperation which described the objectives and procedu­
res of their future foreign-policy coordination in general 
terms only. Except for stressing a general willingness to
7)establish additional forms of consultations "where necessary" , 
the authors did not foresee how to implement common viewpoints 
or joint actions towards the outside world. It was, indeed, 
too early to consider Europe's external representation 
(e.g. role of diplomatic missions in third countries; consul­
tation at international organizations) in greater detail at a 
time when the Six still had to prove their willingness to clo­
ser cooperation in the field of international affairs.
Explicit mention of the association of applicant countries 
was made, however, in Part four of the Luxembourg Report of 
27 October 1970. This was the logical consequence of the Heads' 
of State and Government mandate to seek progress in the internal 
integration process in view of enlargement. To facilitate entry 
into the EPC "club" new members should be familiar with the 
"acquis politique" as early as passible. According to the 
Luxembourg Report,every Ministerial meeting of the Six was to 
be followed by a second Conference of Foreign Ministers of the 
"old" and the "new" Member States. On the level of the Politi­
cal Committee, the chair was charged with involving the staff of 
the Foreign Ministries in the applicant countries about con­
sultations and to report back to his other five colleagues.
Once the agreements on application to the EC would be signed 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway should parti­
cipate fully within EPC.*^
Until the first balance of the Nine's cooperation (Norway had 
to withdraw after the negative vote of its people on 26 Sep­
tember 1972) was drawn in 1973 (Copenhagen Report 23 July 1973), 
contacts with third countries arose gradually on an ad hoc ba­
sis. The more the preparation of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) progressed with the Nine acting 
9)as a unit, the more frequent were the contacts with the rest 
of the 35 participating countries. First steps as a single in­




























































































1 0 )Nations at that time. The Nine's second main topic of con­
sultation beside the CSCE, the Arab-Israeli conflict, marks 
the beginning of contacts with countries of the Middle East 
region, which in their initial period caused some irritations 
among the Nine about their representation towards third countries.
Out of these experiences more detailed arrangements were needed 
to go beyond the procedures established within the EC borders. 
Consequently >the Copenhagen Report stressed the incorpora­
tion of the Nine's ambassadors in third countries and their 
representatives at international organizations into the EPC net­
work. It is, however, interesting to note that the Foreign Mi­
nisters stressed primarily the Heads' of the Missions contri­
bution to formulating common European views on specific inter­
national issues of interest for the decisions of the Nine.
Nothing was said on how the EC countries should make known 
their views towards the outside world. The role of regular 
consultations among the EC countries' embassies was oriented 
towards facilitating the internal EPC decision-making process.
The Political Committee would address itself to the posts abroad 
for information (including common reports on.specific que­
stions of common interest). In their second report the Foreign 
Ministers welcomed the fact that the "coordination reflex" had 
already swept from the Nine's capitals to their embassies
in third countries. Again, no explanations were given on how 
results of the foreign policy consultations should be trans­
mitted to the countries concerned or whether and how outside 
observers should communicate with the new actor in internatio­
nal politics.
In political practice ,the Nine's first steps towards harmonized 
positions on the fourth Middle East War of 1973 and the setting 
up of a dialogue with the countries of the Arab League direct­
ly affected European-American relationship. Worried about the 
ambitions of its junior partner in world affairs, the United 
States pressed for close association with EPC. After lengthy 
discussions during Kissinger's proclaimed "Year of Europe",
the Nine responded favourably to the American demand. In their
1 2 )"Gymnich Gentleman's Agreement" , the Foreign Ministers de­




























































































interests and needs of each individual case. If one of the Nine 
wished to inform a third country and the others agreed on it, 
the Presidency was charged to act as spokesman of the group. The cho­
sen procedure, however, did not prevent other member govern­
ments from contacting third countries on EPC issues on a bi­
lateral basis.
Out of this pragmatic approach, a variety of both ad hoc and
formalized contacts emerged,attributing a steadily growing
role to the country holding the Presidency. Already acknowledged
1 3)at the Paris Summit of 1974 the President's task as repre­
sentative of the Nine/Ten in international diplomacy was ex­
plicitly stressed in the latest EPC document, the Foreign Mi­
nisters' Report of 13 October 1981, and by the European Council 
in the Solemn Declaration on European Union of 19 June 1983. 
Whereas the latter only briefly reaffirms the need for a clo­
ser cooperation in foreign policy issues,particularly by 
"strengthening the Presidency's power of ... representation
in relations with third countries" and by "increased contacts"
1 4)with non-EEC Member States , the former deals expressly and 
extensively with the "external relations" of EPC.
1 51In greater detail, Chapter seven of the London Report 
enumerates various forms of contacts between the Ten and other 
third countries interested in Political Cooperation:
* "The Presidency may meet individual representatives of third 
countries."
* In this "and if the Ten so agree", it may be accompanied by 
the preceding and succeeding Presidency (Troika).
* "The Presidency may respond to a request for contacts with 
a group of Ambassadors of Member States of organizations 
with which the Ten maintain special links."
* Furthermore, meetings of the Presidency with representatives 
of a third country are foreseen "in the margins of a Mini­
sterial level meeting of the Ten", however, only with the 




























































































* The Heads of Mission of the Ten in third countries meet with 
representatives of the host countries if the latter express 
the "desire" to do so.
In addition to the aforementioned procedures,the Foreign Mi­
nisters agreed on the principle that it is the Presidency's 
task to inform third countries about the content of common 
statements of Ministerial and European Council meetings. This 
is why the Ten's texts should be "accompanied by a list of 
posts in third countries where the local representative of the 
Ten will draw the declarations to the attention of the host go­
vernment." If such a list is lacking,the Presidency is free to 
take the initiative.
On the one hand, these general rules cover the various forms 
of the Ten's current diplomacy; on the other hand,official 
EPC documents keep silent about the reach and frequency of 
contacts established up to now,as well as about the quality 
of the Ten's activities towards the outside world. Official 
EPC texts traditionally reflect procedures which in practice 
have been under way for a certain time; the format of already 
existing contacts and the creation of new ones develop on a 
flexible and pragmatic basis before being fixed as a general 
principle. Latest proposals (made e.g. by the Ad hoc Committee 
on Institutional Affairs to the European Council, Dublin in 
December 1984) aim at the creation of a secretariat which might 
relieve the Presidency as spokesman of the Ten, among other 
things, and at a single European representation in certain in­
ternational organizations and third countries. Within EPC 
circles the improvement of the Ten's cooperation in and with
third countries is on the agenda. Subsequent Presidencies from
16 )the United Kingdom in 1981 onwards, ' deal with the question 
of how to "europeanize" the Ten's missions abroad both in terms 
of a mere coherent representation towards the host governments 





























































































III. EPC contacts with third countries: an attempt to design 
some categories
Since the early days of EPC,the number of contacts with the 
outside world has developed steadily at all levels, with an obvious 
dynamism during the last years. Irrespective of the size of 
its national diplomatic apparatus,the Presidency feels a grow­
ing workload in its role as spokesman of the Ten. Some observers 
presently note a "boom" on the part of third countries seeking to 
establish links with the Ten. The reason behind this trend: several 
not yet "privileged"countries are eager to reach the same formal 
status the Europeans have given to another country of the same 
region. It is also said that smaller countries, in particular, 
will be "heard" by the Ten only if a formal framework exists.
The present trend towards a dialogue between EC countries and 
other groupings may well be interpreted as the latter's 
attempt to compensate for a certain feeling of inferiority.
To the extent that an outside analyst is capable of lifting 
the curtain of informality and confidentiality which governs 
EPC diplomacy, presumably even more than national foreign po­
licy-making, he feels the need to systematize the existing net­
work. A first attempt to design some categories of EPC con­
tacts with third countries is made here.
First of all, it might be helpful to differentiate between 
ad hoc and institutionalized contacts with third countries.
Some characteristics of both forms are elaborated in point 
1 and 3 of this chapter. The reader will, however, immediately 
realize that each category in itself has different "faces", 
which need further consideration and qualification. On the 
other hand, certain forms of EPC's "external relations" may be 
classified both as already formalized or still ad hoc and in­
formal depending on the observer's approach. The network of 
the Ten's contacts at the UN General Assembly and at the va­
rious stages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 




























































































1. Generally speaking, ad hoc, informal contacts cover the whole 
range of activities (information, consultation, action) the 
Presidency undertakes as spokesman of the Ten towards repre­
sentatives of non-EC countries both individually and as a group 
in the framework of international organizations, both govern­
mental and non-governmental.
One major part of the Presidency's task is simply to keep 
in contact with the outside world, to inform about EPC posi­
tions, to hear third countries' comments etc.: i.e. to manage 
the daily "diplomatic trade" as does every other actor on the 
international scene. Exchanges of information on concrete EPC 
issues may take place within the Community countries usually in the 
capital of the country holding the Presidency. Be it somebody from a 
diplomatic mission or a government official from abroad who 
pays a bilateral or explicitly EPC-related visit to the country 
in the chair, this kind of behaviour is difficult to describe 
in detail. Even inside the EPC bureaucracy deficits in know­
ledge become obvious.
>Up to now the Presidency has been free to choose how to spread 
news on the Ten's contacts with the outside world. Due to 
different political styles,the level of information varies 
from one Presidency to another.
The mixture and frequency of contacts varies according to the 
Ten's agenda and international developments. As one element of 
continuity among others, mention can be made of the series of 
contacts between the Presidency and the parties concerned by 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Be it the Secretary General of the 
Arab League or other political figures (e.g. Egyptian Presi­
dent, King of Jordan, Israeli Government), or lower ranking 
officials from those countries, a network of outside "lobbying" 
to which the EC countries have and want to react has grown over 
the years. Its concrete outlook, however, changes according to 
the priority the Presidency is ready to attribute to the ex­
ternal relations of EPC as well as to the access of third 





























































































Furthermore, this first set of traditional "diplomatic trade" 
covers part of the activities undertaken by the Presidency 
outside the "EC borders". Be it in his capacity as spokesman 
of the Ten, be it as representative of the national govern­
ment, members of the Presidency dispose of an enormous number 
of communication channels to inform about EPC when they visit 
third countries or attend international conferences etc.
European diplomatic missions abroad and their contacts with 
the host governments play an important role. Besides, more re­
cently special meetings of the Ten's Heads of Mission with the 
local press are envisaged on a regular basis. Consultations 
among the Ten's embassies intensified considerably. The fre­
quency of meetings on the ambassadorial level and below is 
high; it ranges from monthly gatherings (the rule) to bi-month­
ly and even weekly ones, informal contacts included. Contrary 
to developments within the European borders, where the idea of 
associating selected third countries more closely- with EPC by 
holding common meetings met with opposition from some EC countries, 
this procedure has been established abroad. In an ever-increas­
ing number of posts,the Ten invite representatives of the host 
government and the political world to participate in their 
discussions, a change in practice which might be seen as a 
qualitative shift from purely ex post information to a certain 
form of consultation in advance.
The fact-finding tours of the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to the Middle East fol­
lowing the Venice Declaration of 1980 are among the most well- 
known examples of another category of the Ten's external beha­
viour towards third countries: concrete actions. To the extent that 
the EC countries have successfully harmonized their views on a wide 
range of international issues over the years, declaratory di­
plomacy was felt to be inadequate to Europe's real role in 
world affairs. For several years, the Ten have tried not only to 
speak with one voice, but also to act in concert and to take over 
concrete responsibilities for solving international problems.
The participation of "European" troops in the Sinai peace-keep­
ing force may serve as an(in the end successful) example to il­





























































































Lord Carrington's trip to Moscow in July 1981 when he submit­
ted the Ten's proposals on Afghanistan to the Soviet govern­
ment, and Tindemans' visit to Turkey in 1982, the result of the 
Ten's concern about democratic structures and the violation of 
human rights in non-EEC countries, represent concrete activi­
ties undertaken at high level by the spokesman of the Ten. 
Intervening in the name of the EC countries on specific is­
sues predominantly concerning human rights violations,
is part of the task the embassies of the country holding the Presi­
dency have to fulfil. Over the years the Presidency has launched 
a number of démarches to free people from prison, torture and 
oppression all over the world (Africa, Latin/Central America,
Soviet Union).
2. "External" contacts at international organizations/conferences 
may be dealt with separately. Although belonging in principle 
to the category of ad hoc contacts, they have reached a cer­
tain degree of formalization for example on the fringe of the 
annual session of the UN General Assembly, in the CSCE at its 
various stages where the Nine/Ten act as a group and via the 
Presidency, which as the spokesman of EPC has become an accepted 
interlocutor.
Already in early days of EPC, diplomats from Israel and Egypt 
regularly informed the ambassadors of the Nine in New York of 
their interpretation of UN texts on the Middle East conflict. 
Representatives from Greece, Turkey and Cyprus as well as am­
bassadors from Africa (e.g. Nigeria) set up contacts with the
Nine during the mid-Seventies. Both the Soviet Union and the
17 )United States gradually followed this strategy, too. ' After 
initial shortcomings in US-European consultations in the UN 
framework, which seemed to be located on both sides of the 
Atlantic (at least) the procedures improved and led to regular 
meetings between the US Ambassador to the UN and the Presidency, 
represented by the respective Head of one of the European mis­
sions. More recently, common discussions of the Ten and the 
United States at ambassadorial level take place.
As EPC progressed at the UN, some states - particularly the smaller




























































































certain degree. Some of these sought to compensate by establish­
ing closer links within European capitals, i.e. in the country 
holding the Presidency. At the UN, contacts with the Nine re­
mained sporadic over the Seventies. The idea of creating an 
enlarged group of about 20 Western countries (ranging from the 
USA to Malta) - the Vinci Group - did not meet with much en­
thusiasm on the part of the EC Member States.
An ever-closer harmonization of views between the Nine/Ten and 
their partners of the alliance arose out of the CSCE process. 
From the preparatory stage of the Helsinki Conference up to 
Madrid and Stockholm, a network of institutionalized contacts 
between the EPC and the NATO caucus was set up. Meetings of the 
Nine/Ten were usually followed by those of the 15, today 16 
members of the Atlantic Alliance ' ; this procedural order 
does not imply, howeverj that the smaller caucus decided upon 
the guidelines and content of common positions, which were 
submitted to the larger group for approval. This was the case u 
up to the Belgrade conference; later on a shift in weight from 
the EPC to the NATO level became obvious. Towards the Eastern 
caucus and the group of the Neutral and Non-Aligned states 
the Presidency or the Nine/Ten as a whole seemed to play a 
minor role as interlocutor outside the plenary CSCE sessions.
The flow of information between the "blocs" was obviously chan­
nelled from one country to another on an ad hoc and individual 
basis;. The rules concerning EPC' s diplomacy towards non-member 
countries did not prevail in the CSCE process.
3. The second main pattern of "external relations" refers to 
formalized procedures,which are understood in general as the 
Ten's "contacts with third countries". Going into detail, how­
ever, the analyst discovers a multitude of different contacts 
between the Ten and a third country or a group of states. The 
degree of formal institutionalization or informality, frequen­
cy and duration, as well as the level and size of meetings, 
are as varied as the informal contacts: as William Wallace
wrote on Political Cooperation generally: EPC does not re-




























































































The following analysis of EPC's "external relations" is broadly 
based on the Ten's own understanding at present of EPC contacts 
with third countries. In terms of geographical regions, Western 
Europe and North America prevail,not surprisingly in view of how 
long these contacts exist. Another, and obviously more suitable, 
typology might be "allied and like-minded countries". The table 
below clearly reflects that most countries closely associated 
with the Ten belong to the "West" in general and the Atlantic 
Alliance in particular. Within this group, the former and pre­
sent applicant countries may be dealt with separately because 
of their privileged status as candidates for full EPC member­
ship. Another criterion to be discussed may be the distinction 
between the Ten's contacts to individual third states and those 
to certain groups of countries. It is also interesting to note 
whether consultations take place at political,i.e. ministerial 
or senior official level, or both, and who is representing the 
European side, i.e. the Presidency, the Troika, the Ten as a 
whole.
The following description goes much along the lines of "allied 
and friendly" countries or the Western "Camp" and "others".
In some way it also reflects the history and evolution of EPC 
contacts with third countries/groups of countries:
the Western "Camp" EC acceding countries Others
Australia 1 .1 .73 Denmark, Ireland, People's Re-
Canada (Norway)Kingdom
, United public of 
China




































































































a) The group of Western countries
How to associate the US has been a key issue for EPC since it 
was set up in 1970. The Gentleman's Agreement of 1974 provided 
a framework for informal discussions between the Foreign Ministry 
of the_Presidency and US representatives. Even today some 
stress that contacts still take place on an ad hoc basis; 
others agree that certain tendencies towards institutionali­
zation are visible. The main centres of EPC - US contacts are 
the capital in the country holding the Presidency, Washington 
and New York (UN). The US mission to the EC in Brussels plays 
the role of a coordinator among US posts within the European 
borders and that of a central information agency towards the 
Administration in Washington. Consultations between represen­
tatives of the US embassy and government officials of the Pre­
sidency are said to be regular and close. The level of contacts 
varies depending upon the issues of the agenda and, sometimes, 
as insiders say, the size of US embassies in European capitals. 
The Middle East, East-West relations, especially the CSCE, and 
Central America are among the topics of mutual interest.
American diplomats first of all address the "heart" of EPC, 
the Political Committee, and in particular its chairman. 
Compared with most other third countries, the USA finds it­
self in a privileged position: the US Ambassador to the country 
holding the Presidency is informed about the agenda of those 
meetings in advance,. enabling the American side to com­
ment on the points of interest before consultations take place 
among the Ten. These outside views are then explained by the
chairman to his colleagues at the beginning of the Committee 
20)meeting. Furthermore, the Presidency reports back to US 
officials on the results of the Ten's deliberations. A similar 
procedure was established - at least for a certain time - 
on the working-group level. As some Europeans are uneasy with 
the procedure and feared creating a precedent for other third 
countries to go beyond the present status qou seems unlikely.
Concerning more "formalized" contacts with members of the Ad­
ministration in Washington, it took until 1982 to organize spe­




























































































UN General Assembly, the European Troika headed by the Danish 
Political Director assisted by his colleague of the preceding
and the succeeding Presidency met with "high level officials" 
from the Reagan Administration. Since then it seems that this 
kind of a European-American dialogue takes place once in each 
presidential term. Ministerial meetings still are the excep­
tion to the rule, leaving aside the "normal" contacts between 
the US Secretary of State and his colleagues in Europe, which 
may of course also deal with Political Cooperation issues, 
thus adding to the specific EPC procedures, e.g. within NATO, 
at the Summit of the Seven or bilaterally.
The establishment of links with the US government in Washing­
ton was hampered both by a certain ignorance on the American 
side regardingthe new actor and by reservations on behalf of 
some European governments who hesitated to give priority to
a single representation of the Nine/Ten instead Of privileged
22)bilateral contacts. Those EC Member States who favoured a 
more independent European role in world affairs wanted to keep 
a certain distance from the US, instead of "going into bed 
with an elephant". Since 1975 access to the White House and 
the State Department has improved. In special cases of utmost 
interest to the US government,such as the Camp David accords, 
Washington increased the flow of information to gain European 
support.
Today it is customary to organize periodic luncheon meetings 
between US officials and the ambassadors of the Ten and, oc­
casionally, with the Presidency ambassador.
From 1982 onwards it has become a general rule that the Fo­
reign Minister or Head of State or Government of the incoming 
Presidency holds talks with his American counterpart in Washing­
ton covering EC and EPC issues. This arrangement, esteemed in 
particular by the small Community countries when acting as 
Europe's spokesman, does not always meet with enthusiasm on 
behalf of the US Administration when it comes to fix a date 
with the Foreign or Prime Minister of a small Member State. 





























































































For years, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have shown in­
terest in the foreign policy coordination of the EC countries. 
Informality and pragmatism along the lines of the London Re­
port presently mark the contacts with these countries which 
are loose compared to those of the other countries of the We­
stern "Camp". The capital of the Presidency is to be seen as 
the centre for information; the Heads of Mission are said to
present themselves regularly in the Foreign Ministry of the
23)country holding the Presidency. Up to now the exchange of 
views is restricted to senior official level; Ministerial meet­
ings are not planned yet. In addition, the Ten reacted favour­
ably to proposals made by the governments in Ottawa and Welling­
ton to arrange meetings between the European Heads of Mission 
and the Canadian and New Zealand authorities in the capital 
of the host government.
The format of consultations with Japan clearly indicates the 
importance both partners attach to harmonizing their views 
also on international political issues. After initial 
steps in 1979, contacts now take place in a formalized way. a 
Once every six months a ministerial meeting is foreseen bring­
ing together the Japanese Foreign Minister and the President 
in office of the Ten accompanied by his colleagues of the last 
and the incoming Presidency. The premiere took place during 
the Presidential term of the Federal Republic of Germany (first 
half of 1983) after the EC countries had agreed to the Japanese 
suggestion earlier that year. Due to the full diaries of Mini­
sters the Japanese proposal to meet alternately in Europe and 
in the Japanese capital is far from becoming reality.
Gatherings on the fringe of other meetings (e.g. OECD) seem to 
be an appropriate way to manage these difficulties. Latest de­
velopments indicate that both sides agreed to expand contacts 
at the directorial level, including both the Presidency country 
and Japan as meeting places. Already in 1982 the Japanese 
Foreign Minister held talks with the current President in 
office,though still on an ad hoc basis, when he paid a visit 
to several countries in Europe and when Leo Tindemans visited 
Tokyo during the Belgian Presidency of 1982. At ambassadorial 
level the Ten regularly exchange viewswith the Japanese Politi­
cal Director in Tokyo. Now and then these meetings are attended




























































































As one observer rightly states, it was the concern with US
policy since the late Seventies which led both Europeans and
Japanese to look for coalition partners to strengthen their 
24 )own positions. The US hostages in Téhéran and the Soviet 
invasion in Afghanistan mark the beginning of close consulta­
tions and even concerted action against the Iranian authori­
ties. The war between Iran and Iraq is another topic of mutual 
interest of both sides, as is the Middle East as a whole.
East-West relations in their various dimensions represent 
another subject under discussion.
EPC's individual contacts with the group of Western countries 
described above are supplemented by common ministerial meet­
ings of the same countries in the framework of ASEAN. There 
the Ten (represented according to the Troika formula) meet re­
gularly with their colleagues from Australia, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand, and the USA, together with the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers.
Norway,which was integrated into EPC for several months in 
the early Seventies (January - September 1972), is closely as­
sociated with the Ten,particularly at the official level. Contacts 
with the Presidency country are said to be intensive and fruit­
ful, in general. Again, Political Committee meetings are the 
focal point of interest to the Norwegian embassy in the ca­
pital of the Ten's spokesman. Like representatives of other 
third countries, Norwegian officials are concerned about a cer­
tain lack of continuity in EPC's external relations, which re­
sults from the individual handling of each Presidency and from 
the limited staff in some EC countries.
Apart from informal contacts in the UN-framework,regular meet­
ings take place in the Norwegian capital between the ambas­
sadors of the EC countries and government officials (usually 
the Political Director), and at times the Foreign Minister. 
Furthermore Ministerial meetings - the President in office 
meets his Norwegian colleague once in Europe and once in Oslo -




























































































From the review of the history of EPC's external relations 
Turkey seems to be the longest-standing partner of the con­
sultation system. The Additional Protocol (1970) to the As­
sociation Agreement of 1963 envisaged cooperation on po­
litical issues of mutual interest. To stabilize the Mediterra­
nean region in general (dL.e. the EC's global approach) and the 
southern flank of NATO in particular, Ankara was to be regular­
ly informed on EPC deliberations. Consultations initially li­
mited to the Presidency at the directorial level multiplied and in 
late 1972 were also held on the top political level. From then 
on, the President in office was charged with informing his Tur­
kish counterpart about the Nine's discussions. It is inter­
esting to note that the EEC/Turkey Association Council 
was considered to be the right forum for this informal 
dialogue. The more negotiations on Greece's full EC/EPC mem­
bership progressed,the more consultations with Turkey came to 
a halt. To keep a certain balance in the EC's relations with 
the two countries, in 1978 the Nine offered to strengthen their 
political dialogue with the Turkish government to compensate 
for Greece's EPC membership. Only in 1980, however, did the 
Turks accept the offer of the Nine. Ankara, for good rea­
sons, favoured consultations as equal partners, i.e. contacts 
with the Presidency should go beyound purely ex post informa­
tion on common positions the Nine/Ten had adopted already be­
fore meeting the Turkish representatives. This format of con­
sultations at an early stage, however, was difficult to enter 
for the EC countries and obviously incompatible with the consen­
sus principle of the EPC decision-making.
From December 1980 onwards, it has become a general practice 
to meet once or twice every six months in the country holding 
the Presidency. The European side is usually represented by 
the Political Directors (Troika); the Turkish delegation is 
led by a senior official of the Foreign Ministry assisted by 
diplomats from Turkish missions in EC countries, according to 
the rotating Prsidency.
The military seizure of power in September 1980 did not affect 




























































































contact with the Turkish authorities. The Generals' request 
for consultations on the level of Foreign Ministers, however, 
met with a certain hesitation on the European side. It was ac­
cepted "in principle" without advocating regular meetings.
The first and up to now only meeting took place in September 
1981, during the British chairmanship. Since then relations 
have worsened owing to Turkey's internal policy, which did 
not fulfil European hopes of Turkey's speedy return to demo­
cracy. Turkey's internal developments had an effect both on 
the agenda of the Ten's discussions among themselves and with 
the government in Ankara. Whereas issues like the Middle East 
or East-West-relations usually mark the Ten's talks with third 
countries, in the case of Turkey the political situation of 
the country itself is a major point of the common discussions. 
The EPC/Turkish relationship is also significantly different 
from the contacts described above from the point of view of 
bilateral links - both "special partnership" and rivalry - 
between EC members and third countries. 1983 marks the year 
of extremes in EPC contacts with Turkey: during the German Pre­
sidency consultations intensified (in quantitative terms at 
least); two directorial meetings were held instead of the usual 
one. During the following Greek Presidency (second half of 1983) 
the dialogue came to a halt which lasted through the French 
Presidency of 1984. Some may argue that bilateral contacts bet­
ween Turkey and EC Member States or the Commission may serve 
as a substitute; from the point of view of a country which 
attaches great importance to a certain format (as a sign of 
acceptance by the Ten), the present situation is felt to
be discriminatory.
b) Among the group of Western countries, those who once have been 
or still are candidates far EC membership dispose of specific 
links to EPC which justify treating these countries se­
parately .
Contacts between the "old" and future "new" members of EPC 
start from a somewhat formalized basis: a letter explaining 
the principle of both EPC procedures and content is handed 




























































































tion process for EC membership. According to EPC rules, this 
communication is not of a binding character. It serves to in­
form the applicants about EPC in general. In turn, acceding 
countries in a reply usually accept future participation in 
principle.
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom were closely associated 
with EPC from its very beginning. Special meetings of Foreign 
Ministers of the Six and the candidates were held immediately 
after "normal" consultations at ministerial level. From the 
date of signing the accession treaties the "newcomers" were 
fully integrated into Political Cooperation.
For the "southern" enlargement a somewhat different procedure 
was chosen, extending the transition period from the stage of 
information on EPC to that of full participation. The Nine's 
decision to let the candidates wait for full EPC membership un­
til the ratification process was finished and EC membership de­
finitely approved in all countries was a clear consequence of 
the "Norwegian case". During the period of EC negotiations, 
therefore,Greece was regularly informed on the Foreign Mini­
sters' and Political Directors' consultations via the Presi­
dency. From the date of signature of the accession treaty (May
1979), information was said to be transformed into consulta- 
27)tion, the country in the chair taking the leading
role. The Athens government's association with EPC ended in full 
participation in late 1980 before Greece became a member of 
the EC on 1 January 1981.
During EEC negotiations with Portugal and Spain, periodic bi­
lateral talks with some"Communautarians" (e.g. the Federal Re­
public) were of major interest a long time. In early 1982 the 
European Council as well as the Foreign Ministers felt the need 
to intensify EPC contacts with the two "newcomers", at least
quantitatively. They publicly stressed keeping the applicant countries2 q )"closely informed" ' about EPC, which in practice meant an ex 
post exchange of views on the issues of the Ten's discussions. 
Meetings are presently held on the ministerial and directorial le­
vel. Unlike the practice during the "northern" enlargement, 




























































































The initial idea of a Foreign Ministers' meeting of Twelve 
was substituted by the Troika formula in 1983,after a trial pe-. 
riod in 1982. The change in format , some argued, was due to re­
strictions in the diaries of participants. In any case, it 
may also be understood as a certain signal as to the priority 
some partners among the Ten may give to consultations with the 
applicant countries. Another argument put forward is a certain 
feeling of imbalanced representation and EC predominance if 
the formula the 'Ten/Portugal, Spain' is used. Unlike the Mi­
nisters' meetings, on the level of Political Directors con­
tacts with Portugal and Spain are organized separately (once 
per Presidency; Troika formula).
The representation of Twelve at the San José meeting with 
Central American states (September 1984) marks a new element 
in the Ten's contacts with Portugal and Spain. The outside ob­
server is inclined to interpret this new "European face" as a 
sign of a qualitative leap in EPC relationship towards acceding 
countries, at least in a specific issue area. Details on the >
preparatory stage of the Costa Rica Conference and on the im­
plementation of the agreed conclusions may allow a more in-depth 
assessment on the participation of the Portuguese and Spanish 
side. At any rate, the Ten agreed to repeat the exercise during 
1985.
c) Others
The third and relatively young category of EPC's "external re­
lations" mainly consists of contacts with several groups of 
countries. The format seems to offer advantages for both si­
des: it corresponds well to European efforts to stabilize in­
ternational politics by promoting forms of an intra- and inter­
regional dialogue; non-EC countries favour representation with­
in a group because it reduces the feeling of inferiority.
29)The ASEAN countries are among the Ten's privileged part­
ners in Third World regions. Every 18 months meetings take place on
the ministerial level. Consultations on "political" issues have 
broadened since the beginning of the dialogue in 1978; initial­




























































































(e.g. Kampuchea, refugee problem) the Foreign Ministers today 
also discuss other EPC topics, particularly East-West relations 
(e.g. Afghanistan).
The continuity of the European-ASEAN relationship contrasts 
with the ups and downs of the Euro-Arab-Dialogue (EAD) . ^
Staring in 1975, with the problem of how to integrate the PLO, 
high-level meetings have been blocked by inner-Arabic crises 
caused by Sadat's policy and Egypt's exclusion from the Arab 
League in 1979. Attempts to revive EAD's central organ - the 
General Commission composed of senior officials (ambassadorial 
level) from every member of the two groups - had only limited 
success. Though supporting in principle the idea of enlarging 
the originally "economic" dialogue to a "political" one the Ten 
still hesitate to change the existing formula. Up to now the 
Arabs'idea, of holding conferences of Foreign Mi­
nisters has not become reality. The results of the December 1983 
meeting of the General Commission (restricted representation) 
after a five years' break,which could be interpreted as a step 
forward, was not encouraging, nor were further steps during 1984.
Institutionalized contacts with Latin American states may be 
characterized as a nine days' wonder; only once (1980) EC Fo­
reign Ministers held discussions with their colleagues of the
31)Andean Pact which were primarily oriented towards closer
economic links. Both the idea of economic cooperation and po­
litical support for the Contadora peace initiative in Central 
America led Europe to propose a dialogue with this group (Co­
lumbia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela). Still ad hoc in nature, 
yearly meetings on ministerial level are becoming a general rule, 
although the concrete formula varies (EPC Troika/Contadora,
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua at the 
Costa Rica meeting in 1984).
In Western Europe, as well, the format of group-to-group discus­
sions has found followers. In the aftermath of the Genscher-Colombo 
initiative,the Council of Europe, at least its non-EC members,




























































































pean integration and to reconsider the relations between the 
two bodies. In this context the then Austrian Foreign Minister, 
Pahr, proposed to intensify the already existing discussions on 
international issues between the Ten and the Eleven (i.e. the 
non-EC members of the Council of Europe). In addition to infor­
mal talks of Foreign Ministers on the fringe of Committee of 
Ministers' meetings,consultations at the senior official level 
(Political Directors or Ambassadors) were suggested. The Ten
responded favourably to the proposal in early 1983. On the ba-
32)sis of an agreed agenda on "some topics of EPC", the Presiden­
cy (Troika) informed the representatives of the non-EC members 
of the Council of Europe in April that year. The succeeding 
Presidencies should follow the procedure once during each term. 
More recently,the German Foreign Minister launched the idea of 
intensifying informal discussions at political level.
Another development of EPC contacts with third countries 
in the Eighties concerns the People's Republic of China. As one 
element of intensifying EC-Chinese relationship, the Ten esta­
blished a fixed mechanism for political consultations. In June 
1983,the chairman of the Political Directors met the Chinese 
Ambassador to the country holding the Presidency. Contacts pro­
gressed during the French Presidency in 1984, judging by the33)change in format of the meeting (ministerial level; Troika)
East-West relations and the Middle East region 
were among the topics of mutual interest. As a consequence 
of the Ten's concertations with some of the countries mentioned 
before, India also wanted to be associated with EPC. As a clear 
sign of European support for the non-aligned countries, a posi­
tive answer was given to the Indian request in 1984. The two 
sides agreed to adopt the same procedures as in the Chinese 
case.
Formalized contacts between the Ten and Israel at the ministerial 
level seem to be close to reality. Apart from the informal net­
work established with the Presidency, traditional links with 
some EC Member States and regular gatherings in the framework 
of the Cooperation Council EEC/Israel the French took the initia­




























































































Claude Cheysson, as President in office, in early 1984 invited 
his colleagues to hold an informal exchange of views with the 
Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir on the Middle East conflict , 
after the normal Cooperation Council session had ended. It needs 
to be seen whether succeeding Presidencies will follow this first 
step; at least the Israeli government would be in favour of it.
IV. Some patterns of outside perceptions: the Ten as a 
"third power"?
34 )"En fait, l'image extérieure des Neuf est trop flatteuse."
This assessment, given some years ago by one of the experts 
on EPC,; when homogenity of views was obviously easier to reach, 
remains true today. Notwithstanding EPC's inherent limits 
(e.g. consensus principle, few instruments, intergovernmentalism, 
negative repercussions of Community crisis) the Ten are an at­
tractive interlocutor to the outside world. A steadily growing 
number of third countries is interested in establishing closer 
political ties with Europe. The format of contacts varies.
Some wish to be associated on a formal institutionalized basis 
for reasons of prestige and the country's own international 
profile. Others, particularly within the Western "camp",
prefer informality, which allows information and even consul­
tation at an early stage. Some outside observers are satis­
fied to receive details on EPC declarations via the Presidency 
and publicly to share common positions with the Ten on issues 
of mutual interest. Others favour influencing EPC decision­
making in advance, i.e. before the Ten agree on common view­
points.
It is largely the Community's economic weight and its external 
relations which are of interest to the outside world. Third 
countries then perceive that the members of the economic "power", 
Europe, also share common views on a wide range of internatio­
nal political questions which are made public in numerous of­
ficial statements by the Foreign Ministers and increasingly 




























































































The Presidency's intensified activities as spokesman of the 
Ten, and in particular the Troika formula for strengthening 
continuity, seem to contribute to this positive image. Diverging 
views and conflicts of interest within the EPC circle seem to 
be unknown or at least are ignored from an outsider's perspecti­
ve. No doubt, after more than ten years' experiences with EPC 
diplomacy, those third countries which followed Europe's ef­
forts "to make its voice heard in world affairs" from the very 
beginning might be better aware of the Ten's real internatio­
nal weight and their internal cohesion. They seem to be familiar 
with the existing network of groupings and actors. Others may 
be unsure whom they should address within the "European borders" 
where the Ten, the Council, the EC Commission, the European 
Parliament and also the Member States individually all play 
a role in international affairs.
EPC contacts with third countries do not substitute bilateral 
diplomacy between individual EC Member States and outsiders.
On the contrary, some argue that the external relations of EPC 
led to intensified cooperation between (the small) EC- and non- 
EC countries on a bilateral basis. This tendency will likely 
increase to the extent the Ten and future Twelve fail to reach 
consensus on international issues. Under these circumstances, 
however, the "Big Four" within the EPC club will be better off 
as privileged partners of the outside world.
History shows that the Ten's credibility as a major internatio­
nal actor is questioned now and then. Which EC Member State 
(big or small) acts as interlocutor is or at least was of a 
certain importance. In the seventies, e.g. Ireland during its 
Presidencies met with reservation on behalf of the US Admini­
stration. The Arab side doubted the then Nine's reliabi­
lity when it was "only" Denmark who informed about the Euro­
peans' position on the Arab-Israeli conflict in November 1973.
In the aftermath of the Venice Declaration of June 1980, again, 
it was not so easy to understand from the Arab side why every 
six months representatives of another (small) EC Member state 
(Luxembourg in the second half of 1980; the Netherlands in the 




























































































missions of the Presidency agreed upon by the European Council. 
Another aspect affecting the international role of the Ten may 
be seen in the predominantly declaratory diplomacy and in the 
lack of independent EPC instruments. Statements of the Nine/Ten 
first tend to raise the hopes of third countries, which are dis­
appointed when common views fail to be transformed into common 
actions. Again, the Middle East conflict may serve to illustrate 
this.
In the eyes of numerous Third World countries the EC Member 
States appeared as an emerging "third power" on the interna­
tional scene where the two superpowers set the tone. The "ci­
vilian power" Europe seemed to offer cooperation on the basis 
of equal partnership,thus supporting the emancipation of de­
veloping countries. Reality proved to be somewhat different. 
Nonetheless "the rest of the world, Eastern Europe included" 
wants to know what the Western Europeans think about a given 
issue before defining their own policy. Outside observers 
may also ask to what extent the Ten's views converge with or differ 
from US perceptions, and what is their potential to influence 
US policy. In cases, where a clearly defined American policy 
was lacking, as in the UN in the mid-seventies, Third World 
countries first of all informed themselves about EPC positions 
and tended to interpret the Nine's policy as policy of the 
"West".
How did the smaller non-EC members of the West react to this 
monopolizing tendency of Political Cooperation? The more the 
Nine/Ten successfully concerted their national foreign poli­
cies, the more non-EC Member States in Western Europe felt
excluded and cut off. At the UN and elsewhere, they tried 
individually and collectively to establish closer links 
with the "club" (e.g. Council of Europe). In the CSCE frame­
work the existence of a Eastern and Western "bloc" (EPC and 
NATO caucus) helped the European neutral and non-aligned 
countries to set up a grouping of their own.
The US Administration shows a somewhat ambivalent attitude.
On the one hand, US concern and even hostility towards an auto­




























































































and has been analysed several times. Be it the Fourth Middle 
East War in 1973, be it the situation in Central America in 
1984, Washington or at least part of the Administration found
it hard to acknowledge not only a "regional" but also a "global"
37) •role for the EC countries. On the other hand, a more co­
herent European policy is beneficial for the USA and serves to 
strengthen Western interests in world affairs, it is argued 
by the American side.
Other NATO members like Norway and Turkey seek close contact 
with the Ten in the hope of strengthening their own and Europe's 
Weight,particularly in influencing US policy. In this context 
the role EPC contacts with allied countries might play in de­
fining a European security policy at an early stage and out­
side the NATO framework seems to become of major importance.
The decision of the members of the Western European Union (WEU), 
in autumn 1984, to revitalize the organization and to make it a 
major forum for discussion of European interests in defence 
matters needs further consideration with respect to the WEU/EPC 
relationship. To the extent the Group of Seven intensifies >
its activities, consultation with the non-WEU members of the 
EPC group will be indispensible to harmonize views towards 
real "European" attitudes. Notwithstanding the "relief" of 
certain EPC members at discussing security issues also (and pos­
sibly predominantly?) outside the Ten, consultation between the 
two bodies is desirable. The concrete format of contacts still needs 
to be defined.
Since the late seventies, when the international climate
- Afghanistan, Poland - worsened and US leadership declined,
as reflected, for example, in the affair of US hostages in
Teheran, third countries outside Europe as well (e.g. Japan)
made increased efforts to find coalition partners. The then 
38 )"Mighty Nine" themselves responded favourably to
common and concerted actions with non-Member States to the 
benefit of Europe's international role. The eighties, however, 
also mark several drawbacks of European Political Cooperation.
One major obstacle is inherent to the Community's own drawbacks.
To the extent the EC countries fail to solve their internal 





























































































It remains to be seen whether 1985 will be the year to give a 
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33) According to Bulletin of the EC, 4/1984, p. 63
34) Philippe de Schoutheete, Coopération, op. cit., p. 121
35) This assessment was made by Rüdiger von Wechmar, Bonn's first 
Ambassador to the UN who left just recently, in: Bergedorfer 
Gesprachskreis, Die deutsche Frage - neu gestellt, Protokoll 
No. 74/1983, p. 88
36) Cf. Beate Kohler, Euro-American relations and European Political 
Cooperation, in: David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel and Wolfgang 
Wessels, European Political Cooperation: Towards a foreign 
Policy for Western Europe, London 1982, pp. 83 - 93; Philippe
de Schoutheete, Coopération, op. cit., p. 60 ff.
37) Cf. Kissinger's famous speech, in: Department of State Bulletin, 
No 1768, 14 May 1973, pp. 593 - 598
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The Future of the "External Relations" of 
European Political Cooperation
by Philippe de Schoutheete
Two preliminary observations are in order before I approach 
the topic of the future of European Political Cooperation's 
"external relations". First, predicting the future in political 
science is always more or less informed guesswork. I have done 
my best to neutralize the influence of my personal policy 
preferences on this guesswork. Second, it is difficult to 
distinguish the future of the "external relations" of EPC from 
the future of EPC itself. After all, European Political 
Cooperation is by nature an external projection of the common 
purpose of the Ten.
That being said it may be useful to distinguish the 
mechanics of EPC —  the possible evolution of the procedures of 
EPC —  from the substance —  the problems which are most likely 
to be in the foreground of EPC activities.
PROCEDURE
The first prediction which can reasonably be made is that 
EPC will continue to develop on the lines it is presently 
following: there will be more of the same. Member States tend to 
consider political cooperation a success story and they view the 
results with what amounts sometimes to self-indulgent 




























































































This view implies that EPC will exert increasing influence 
on the respective national foreign policy apparatuses. Political 
cooperation is frequently, and up to a point rightly, branded as 
too declaratory: but it should not be judged on its declarations 
alone. The real impact of EPC is the influence it exerts on the 
national foreign policies of the Member States. For the same
■>a?
reason one should be careful about introducing too clear a 
distinction between "national" foreign policy and "European" 
foreign policy in the form of EPC. This distinction may be 
useful for analytical purposes, but the truth is that these two 
branches influence each other; neither is chemically pure, both 
are largely interdependent.
There will be a parallel development of the influence which 
political cooperation exerts on the external relations of the 
Community. Mr. Nuttall elaborates this point elsewhere in this 
Working Paper. I will note only that recent relations with 
Poland and Central America have demonstrated the Ten's awareness 
of the political clout which Community activities can carry.
This makes for greater cohesion between the two branches of 
European activity, a point from which I derive considerable 
satisfaction.
Another likely development is an increase in the number of 
political contacts which the Ten entertain with other groups of 
states. Such contacts already exist with the countries of ASEAN, 
the Contadora group, Central America and the Arab League through 
the Euro-Arab Dialogue. Contacts with the Andean Pact countries 
are likely to be consolidated in the not too distant future. The 




























































































choices within the ACP group probably impede the development of a 
political dialogue with the Ten within the institutions of the 
LomU agreements, except on isolated questions like apartheid. On 
the other hand, the Council of Europe has, in the last few years, 
acquired a new function: that of clearing house for a political 
dialogue between the Ten and Western European countries outside 
the EEC. My guess is that the dynamic impulse of Marcelino 
Oreja, the new Secretary General of the Council of Europe, will 
increase this activity.
I have argued elsewhere that the development of contacts 
between groups of states is one of the characteristics of modern 
day diplomacy. It certainly serves to alleviate the 
uncomfortable feeling of inferiority in size and number that an 
isolated state may feel (if it is not a superpower) when seeking 
to establish a dialogue with a ponderous and unwieldy entity like 
the Ten in political cooperation.
Finally, there is the possible emergence of a political 
secretariat. This possibility, which has been proposed time and 
again over the years and always unsuccessfully, seems now a 
little closer than before. It would not be surprising if such a 
proposal, in one form or another, appeared in the conclusions of 
the "Dooge" committee.
The most probable form a political secretariat could take 
would be that of a small diplomatic cell, possibly recruited on 
the basis of an enlarged "troika" system, i.e. the Presidency and 
two countries preceding and succeeding it. It could be assisted 





























































































a secretary general, who would be more likely to be a civil 
servant than a political figure, but who should have sufficient 
standing to be able to talk to ministers and foreign ambassadors. 
It should be based in Brussels in order to facilitate contacts 
with the Commission and the Secretary General of the Council and 
ensure cohesion in the sum of European activities. Its main 
tasks could be:
- memory: archives and precedents, secretariat of the 
meetings .
conscience: to recall the rules and customs of EPC.
external relations at a routine level for the information of 
foreign governments, the "political" level remaining in the 
hands of the Presidency.
A political secretariat, so conceived, would seem to be a 
reasonable compromise between the need to alleviate the task of 
the President (especially in view of enlargement and the 
continuous development of external relations of EPC) and the fear 
of creating a new bureaucracy, which would burden the functioning 
of EPC and compete for "power" with the national administrations.
SUBSTANCE
It seems to me most probable that Member States will devote 
considerable attention in future to three areas where 




























































































matters, relations with the USA and the particular case of 
Greece.
The Nato Council has recently confirmed that the "Defence- 
Detente" equation, which derives from the Harmel report of the 
sixties, remains as valid a political guideline in the eighties 
as it was in the seventies. Nevertheless, European governments' 
perception of the relative weight of the two concepts changed 
between the seventies and the eighties. In the seventies the 
main preoccupation of western European governments in East-West 
relations was the management of dutente in the glow of Ostpolitik 
and the Helsinki agreement. In the eighties the main 
preoccupation has undoubtedly been the stationing of missiles.
The change occurred somewhere between the famous speech by 
Chancellor Schmidt in London in 1977 and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan at the beginning of 1980, with the double-track 
decision of the Nato Council in December 1979 serving as a useful 
benchmark.
Such a change in emphasis, even if the basic concept remains 
valid, could not but have a considerable impact on EPC. Member 
States in political cooperation are well equipped to discuss the 
management of dutente and in fact the CSCE process figured 
prominently on the agenda of EPC activities from the very first 
ministerial meeting at Munich in 1970. But, by their own rules, 
they are not equipped at all to discuss defence matters. 
Therefore, an issue that became in the eighties a major concern 
of several Members States in East-West relations, and in some 
cases the major problem of foreign policy as a whole, fell 




























































































political support of partners would have been most welcome for 
the Member States most directly implicated.
This evolution serves to explain a certain number of events 
in recent diplomatic activity. First, as others have noted, the 
Ten played a leading role at the CSCE conferences of Geneva and 
Belgrade, but a much more subdued one at the conferences of 
Madrid and Stockholm, where the Nato caucus has been predominant. 
Second, internal efforts, first in the London report of 1981 and 
later in the Genscher-Colombo initiative, have been made to 
introduce some discussion of security and/or defence matters in 
the framework of the Ten. Four research institutes in 1981 
suggested independently that strategy and security problems 
should be discussed by a group of "core countries," thereby 
establishing a sort of "directoire" on security matters.
Finally, in 1983 and 1984, Belgium and France proposed that the 
Western European Union should be reactivated.
In the present preliminary stages it is difficult to assess 
the impact of this last development on EPC, but some impact it is 
bound to have. The promoters clearly aim to create a forum for 
discussion of defence matters (and, to some degree, of arms 
procurement) at a European level. WEU was proposed not out of 
appreciation for this specific institution but because it 
happened to exist and to comprise those members or the Ten who 
were ready to discuss defence matters. In this sense it is 
typical of the pragmatic approach which has characterized the 
development of EPC from the very beginning. Precautions will be 
necessary to prevent the reactivation of WEU in any way impairing 




























































































of links between EPC and WEU just as links were built with the 
Community institutions in the formative years of political 
cooperation. With some flexibility on all sides it should be 
possible to reach a situation whereby WEU activities are in fact 
an application of "variable geometry" to political cooperation, a 
concept that academics may wish to analyse and consider.
The matter of relations between Europe and the United States 
comes up repeatedly in discussions of EPC. It is true, as some 
observers have noted, that the level of these relations is rather 
more intense now than it has been in the past. American 
commentators generally greet warmly all indications of EPC's 
vitality. Nevertheless, if the European Community picks up a new 
dynamism in its development, as I hope and think possible, 
differences of tactics, opinion and interests are bound to arise 
between the two sides of the Atlantic in the fields of 
international trade, monetary system and relations with the 
developing world. If political cooperation develops in parallel 
with EEC activities, conflicting views will inevitably appear in 
certain instances, as they did in the case of the Venice 
Declaration on the Middle East. Growing coordination of European 
views in the field of defence, such as I have predicted, might 
have a similar effect. In other words, a more assertive Europe 
would appear in Washington to be a less comfortable ally.
The problem, I believe, is not to discover how these 
difficulties can be avoided —  they probably cannot —  but how 
they should be dealt with. There is probably no snap solution to 
the problem, but what seems evident is that existing mechanisms 




























































































problems which may arise and to avoid surprises and 
misunderstandings. We have to look for something better and more 
coherent whereby, at a relatively high level, discussions and 
exchanges of views can be held on a variety of subjects.
European Political Cooperation was created and has developed 
on the tacit assumption that participating states have a similar 
view of their general geopolitical and strategic interests. The 
advent of the Pasok government in Athens has put this tacit 
assumption in doubt. On certain aspects of policy in the Middle 
East and several aspects of East-West relations, Greece not only 
has views that differ from those of the other Nine but insists on 
underlining the fact. This development has not in fact altered 
the general balance of EPC statements, but it has on several 
occasions (for instance in the Korean Boeing incident and in 
several phases of the Polish crisis) condemned the Ten to 
silence.
Intimations of future difficulties can be discerned from 
other recent events. Upon signing the Solemn Declaration on 
European Union in Stuttgart in June 1983, the Greek government 
asked that a declaration be inserted in the minutes that "nothing 
can restrict its right to determine its foreign policy in 
conformity with its national interest". From a legal point of 
view this affirmation is uncontroverted. But EPC has never been 
a legalistic exercise. It has been a pragmatic enterprise to 
establish common positions and common actions in foreign policy. 
The reaffirmation of "national interest" in the context of a 
declaration aiming at strengthening EPC demonstrated that one of 




























































































of course, also guided by what they see as their national 
interest. But they see their national interest precisely in the 
search for common positions and common actions which is the 
"raison d'etre" of EPC. The Greek government clearly did not, or 
at least not necessarily.
Such a position may well be taken in future by other 
governments, so the problem should not viewed as limited to 
Greece and current political realities. If political cooperation 
is to develop, especially in the context of an enlarged 
Community, it should find ways and means to define a "European" 
position and eventually to act upon it, even if one member has 
reservations or dissents. At times this may be possible through 
"variable geometry". At times perhaps by acting through 
Community channels where majority voting is possible. As is 
frequently the case in EPC, the solutions will be neither very 
neat nor completely satisfactory, but, along with the other 
problems I have mentioned, I suspect that they will occupy the 



























































































































































































THE FUTURE OF THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION
by Simon Nuttall 
Introduction
To discuss the future of the external relations of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) is encouraging, since it implies that they have a present.
To some, this is not self-evident. The current academic orthodoxy seems to be 
that the external relations of "Europe" can best be perceived and categorized 
as a series of broadly coherent activities and policies undertaken by West 
European countries in a variety of fora.
This analysis sets too little store by the declared intention of 
Member States of the Community to use EPC as a means of speaking with one 
voice in international affairs.
It also neglects some characteristics of EPC which distinguish it 
from other ways of coordinating foreign policy. These include : -
- the existence of highly developed machinery for policy formation;
- the fact that positions are regularly made public by recognised 
spokesmen (for example at the United Nations);
- the substantive content of positions and policies.
It is likely that, in the future, the activities of EPC will continue 
on existing lines. We may hope, however, that there will be a strengthening of 
procedures and an improvement in the quality of the product.
2. It has to be recognised that the consensus procedure adopted by 
EPC imposes constraints on rapid qualitative progress. This paper will examine 
ways in which progress may nevertheless be made regardless of the continued 
existence of the veto. Three possibilities will be examined : -
- a more constructive use of possibilities for action within the 
Community framework,
- a strengthening of the external operation of EPC;





























































































More constructive use of possibilities within the Community
3. It might be thought that to achieve a more constructive interplay 
between EPC and the Community requires better coordination than exists at 
present. The shortcomings of such coordination are from time to time criticized 
by the practitioners of EPC. The problem should not be exaggerated, however.
A high proportion of the activities of EPC have little, if any, bearing on the 
Community. An even higher proportion of the activities of the Community is of 
no interest to EPC. In the limited area in which the two overlap, coordination 
is not difficult and does in fact take place. Although it is formally the 
responsibility of the Presidency, the Commission can be of assistance because 
of its direct knowledge and experience of what is going on on both sides. 
Problems do exist in some cases, but usually at the level of coordination 
among departments at the level of national administrations.
4. More thought should be given by Member States to the use of 
Community instruments to achieve foreign policy objectives. Instruments suitable 
for this purpose are : -
- the common commercial policy;
- financial aid
- Cooperation Agreements.
Commerc i a l_go], i c^_measures
5. Economic measures with regard to third countries, designed to 
give effect to foreign policy aims, may be taken under the common commercial 
policy (Art. 113 EEC). This was the case with regard to the Soviet Union 
after the imposition of martial law in Poland and with regard to Argentina 
following the invasion of the Falkland Islands. In both cases, common European 
foreign policy views were given expression by Council Regulations which would 
not have been adopted for reasons of commercial policy alone. Clearly, these 
possibilities have their limitations. There must be serious doubt about the 
effectiveness of sanctions as a long-term response to a given situation, but 





























































































Furthermore, Art. 113 provides further possibilities for action 
which do not encounter the arguments brought against the use of sanctions.
In the first part of this year, following the UN report on the use of 
chemical weapons in the Gulf War, the Council was seized of a proposal to 
regulate by a Community measure the export of certain chemical substances 
used for the manufacture of weapons. For various reasons, this proposal was 
not approved, and Member States took a set of broadly convergent national 
measures. Action by the Community as such would have been more effective in 
practice and more striking in sending a political signal.
The use of common commercial policy instruments for foreign policy 
purposes encounters objections of an institutional nature on the part of 
Denmark, whose authorities are under an obligation to oppose such actions in 
the Council even when there is no objection to the substance of what is 
proposed and the Danish Government is prepared to introduce identical 
national legislation. This might be thought to preclude further Community 
action on these lines. However, it should be recalled that proposals based 
on Art. 113 EEC can be adopted by a qualified majority. Even those who 
favour a wide interpretation of the Luxemburg compromise would have difficulty 
in invoking an important national interest when the disagreement concerns not 
the substance of a measure but the mode by which it should be adopted.
Financial aid
6. The Community Budget may be used to give financial aid to third 
countries in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. An example of this is 
Central America. The Community conducts an aid programme in Central America 
currently running at around 40 mio ECU annually. An additional sum of 20 
mio ECU was put into the draft Budget for 1985, the intention being to 
reinforce the Central American programme. This programme was being run in 
any case for development reasons, but it is unlikely that the additional 
funds would have been forthcoming had it not been thought desirable to 
underline the Community's political and economic approach to the region set 




























































































The Polish Church is promoting a scheme for aid to private 
agriculture and handicrafts financed primarily from outside sources.
Several Member States have indicated that they would support a financial 
contribution by the Community. No decision has yet been taken, pending the 
setting up in Poland of a Foundation to administer the scheme. If in due 
course a decision is taken to make appropriate provision in the Community 
Budget, it will be a further example of using Community funds primarily 
for foreign policy objectives, since the scheme would not have had a high 
enough priority had it been examined from a purely development point of view.
The advantage of the use of Community financial resources is that 
only these carry the European label which gives an action its specifically 
European character.
Coooerat i_on_Agreement s
7. The Community has a number of Cooperation Agreements with 
regional groupings. The Agreement with ASEAN is in force and has been working 
well for some years. The Agreement with the Andean Pact is signed and awaiting 
ratification. An agreement will be negotiated with the countries of Central 
America. This facility provides the Ten with an opportunity to develop a 
distinctive new type of foreign policy approach, which would no longer 
simply be a reflexion of bilateral relations but a dialogue of region to 
region. This could be an important contribution to the way in which inter­
national questions are managed in the future.
8. The Community's Cooperation Agreements with individual third 
countries also give an opportunity for political as well as economic dialogue. 
This is the case with, for example, China and India. In these cases, the 
Cooperation Agreement with the Community give some additional substance to 
the political dialogue with Member States, although they are less important 
than in the case of regional dialogues. Nor is it suggested that there can
or should be political dialogues with all the individual countries with which 




























































































9. It might be thought that the most important and innovative 
"Cooperation Agreement" which the Community has concluded - the Lomé 
Convention - would provide the opportunity for a political dialogue on a 
large scale. There are, however, obstacles in the way of this. The request 
for political dialogue must come from the third countries themselves. It 
cannot be forced on them against their wilt. Because of past history, the 
ACP countries would be particularly sensitive to any suggestion that a 
political dialogue was not on a basis of complete equality, as the misunder­
standing over the suggestion that Lomé III should incorporate the idea of a 
"policy dialogue" has shown. Furthermore, the ACP countries are a disparate 
grouping of States with widely varying political views, which would not 
find it easy to reach common positions for a political dialogue.
Differentiation
10. It is an interesting feature of the instruments available in 
the Community for the pursuit of foreign policy objectives that they are 
more accomodating to differentiation in the position of Member States than 
are the consensus decisions required for policy statements by the Ten. This 
is not a question of "variable geometry", for all Member States continue to 
take part in Community decision-making, but shows a way of setting to one 
side consensus difficulties by allowing Member States to modulate their 
participation in different actions.
For example, when Community economic measures were applied to the 
Soviet Union following the imposition of martial law in Poland, a specific 
measure was adopted exempting Greece. Again, when economic measures were 
taken with regard to Argentina after the invasion of the Falkland Islands, 
Italy and Ireland were able at a later stage to withdraw from them by 
virtue of Article 224 EEC. Of course, the partial application of these 
measures was less effective than if they had been applied by all partners, 
but nevertheless Community action remained possible and continued to make 
a political impact, whereas the rules of EPC would in the same circumstances 




























































































Similarly, as regards aid to Central America, it could be 
difficult for some Member States to give aid bilaterally to El Salvador, 
while others would have similar difficulties with regard to Nicaragua. 
The fact that aid can be given by the Community (on a regional basis), 
allows Member States to distance themselves from particular aspects of 
the action and in part to disengage their direct responsibility.
Drawbacks
11. There is, however, a drawback to greater exploitation of 
the Community by EPC for foreign policy purposes, which is that the 
Community itself is not yet strong enough to bear the weight. This has 
implications for EPC in general and also specific disadvantages.
12. The only qualification for membership of the Ten is 
membership of the Community. There is no exclusive natural affinity 
among the Ten, as opposed to some other grouping, on strategic or 
political grounds. This means that if the Community does not carry 
weight, EPC is not credible. One might argue that the degree of 
credibility of the one is in direct proportion to the degree of 
credibility of the other.
13. Two examples can be given of more practical consequences. 
The first concerns the pressure on Foreign Ministers' time. It has 
frequently happened recently that time allotted to discussion of EPC 
subjects has had to be used for Community subjects instead because of 
the intractability of Community problems which could not be solved in 
the time originally set aside for them. Both EPC Ministerial Meetings 
under the Irish Presidency in the second half of 1985 suffered this fate 
because the time was needed to continue discussions on enlargement. This 
has serious consequences, because the mechanics of EPC require the 
formation of convergent positions through discussion at the political 




























































































Similarly, for eighteen months (between the Stuttgart and Dublin 
European Councils), the European Council was not able to adopt EPC 
conclusions because of lack of time or because failure to agree on 
internal matters would have made it absurd to express in public opinions 
on external matters. This meant not only that the outside world and the 
Ten themselves were deprived of a reference point for the foreign policy 
of the Ten, but also that there was no internal pressure within the Ten to 
review and redefine their positions on the questions of the day.
14. Secondly, the Community's budgetary situation (the need 
for additional own resources; the new rules for budgetary discipline; 
the generally unfavourable economic situation) places limits on the extent 
to which recourse can be had to Community financial actions for foreign 
policy objectives. The more money which can be spent, the greater the 
impact in terms of foreign policy. For example, the additional sum of 
20 mio ECU in the 1985 draft Budget intended for use as aid to Central 
America, referred to above, is not negligeable, but the effect in foreign 
policy terms would have been more impressive if it had been possible to 
make available, say, ten times as much. Similarly, whatever political 
decision is finally taken on a contribution from the Community budget to 
the Polish Church scheme for agriculture, the restrictions on the budget 
exclude any but a token contribution to help finance the pilot stage of 
the scheme. Significant assistance to the later full scale implementation 
of the scheme is financially unthinkable.
Strengthening the external dimension of EPC
15. The intensity of Political Cooperation among Missions of 
the Ten in third countries is commonly underestimated. This is under­
standable, since it takes place further away from interested observers 
and is by its nature less likely to produce public results than EPC in 
the capitals of the Ten. There is, however, a considerable amount of 
activity in the form of formal cooperation meetings, working lunches, 





























































































The increase in this activity dates to some time before the 
London Report, of which a specific section is devoted to the subject.
16. Since then, there has been further discussion on how to 
reinforce this cooperation. In May 1984 the Political Committee issued 
a series of directives to Missions in third countries indicating areas 
in which cooperation should be strengthened.
17. This activity is important because it means that the 
Ambassadors of the Ten engaged in it have a greater consciousness of EPC 
and acquire the habit of thinking together and seeing themselves as a 
group. It also sharpens the profile of the Ten in the eyes of the host 
country.
The Delegate of the Commission regularly takes part in these 
meetings. This is particularly important in ACP countries, where the 
Community is often an important aid donor, and where the Commission's 
representative is consequently more highly regarded by the host 
government than he might be in other countries.
18. The question may be asked whether, in the present difficult 
economic circumstances, there is not scope for extending this type of 
cooperation by searching for ways of administrative cooperation with the 
specific object of cutting costs by sharing facilities or services and 
by avoiding duplication of work. It is not a question of setting up 
"European Embassies" with all the adverse reactions that notion causes 
in some parts of public opinion, but rather practical collaboration in 
areas like consular services, where a positive image of practical 
European cooperation can be presented to the tax-payer.
Response to expectations on the part of third countries
19. Increasing interest has been shown in EPC by third countries, 
especially since the London Report, as evidenced by the number of requests 
for formal contacts which have been made. In addition to the United States, 
there are now formal arrangements for conversations with Japan, China and 
India, as well as the rather different cases of Spain and Portugal and 
ASEAN. This interest shows that the Ten are increasingly perceived as a 




























































































The London Report made special provision to respond to this 
interest, a section being devoted to the organization of relations with 
third countries. Moreover, cooperation among the Ten is increasingly 
obliged to develop in line with pressure of this type exerted on it from 
outside. The organization of the various contacts, whether through 
formal meetings or informal briefings of Ambassadors, takes time and 
requires an effort from the Presidency, which especially the smaller 
countries have difficulty in providing without additional support. At 
the same time, the Ten are more frequently faced with the need to take 
up common positions in order to respond to a specific enquiry or to 
prepare for a meeting. This pressure from outside provides an incentive 
for a development in substance of the positions of the Ten which is not 
organically present in the institutional organization of EPC.
Technological advances
20. Finally, a word about the possibility of profiting from 
advances in modern technology. When Political Cooperation began, there 
was no means by which the participants could communicate directly and 
securely among themselves. This led to the setting up of the Coreu 
network, over which some 5,000 messages are exchanged annually. This 
technical facility has had an important effect on the frequency and 
intensity of consultations.
The cypher telegram is, however, out-of-date in concept when 
compared with the most recent techniques of telecommunications. There is 
reason to hope that progress in the technical aspects of data trans­
mission may be matched by improvements in security, an aspect which has 
hitherto been relatively neglected. It is reasonable to expect that these 
new technical possibilities will have a similar qualitative effect on 
cooperation among the Ten as the introduction of the Coreu network did at 
the time. The habits of easy contact among Foreign Ministries, one of 














































































































































































































































































































































































European Political Cooperation (EPC) has generally been 
regarded as a success, not least by a succession of European 
Foreign Ministers. In the space of fifteen years, some well- 
publicised differences between Greece and its partners 
notwithstanding, the coordination of foreign policy by the ten 
Member States of the European Community has advanced enormously. 
The London Report of 1981 may still appear limited in scope when 
confronted with the example of the nation state. Yet against the 
background of the Luxembourg Report of 1970, the progress made has 
been highly significant. Many officials and academics now talk of 
a 'European reflex', even if common or coordinated action by the 
Ten does not always emerge from their consultations.
What has been particularly impressive for many has been the 
fact that EPC has developed during a period of sometimes intense 
preoccupation within the European Community with internal affairs, 
in particular the absorption of new members and the Community's 
budget. Somehow, even though the Governments and indeed the 
Ministers involved have been the same, EPC has escaped the effects 
of the Community's creeping sclerosis. The interdependence of the 
Community and EPC must sooner or later be felt, but up to now the 
extent of agreement in EPC has often stood in marked contrast to 




























































































Moreover, the development of EPC has taken place against a 
background of increasing East-West tension and growing Euro- 
American difficulties. Both factors demanded closer cooperation 
on the part of the Ten if EPC was to win any credibility at all. 
The role of the United States has often been of critical 
importance, both through American acts of commission and of 
omission. The United States has frequently encouraged closer 
cooperation among its European allies, particularly in support of 
its own policies. However, on other occasions the United States 
has caused its allies to cooperate because it has failed to act or 
it has acted in a way that in the Ten's eyes runs counter to their 
interests. This pattern, perhaps, supports the argument that even 
important EPC policies have been largely reactive.
Whether reactive or not, EPC policies have commanded more 
attention from other governments as their scope has been 
broadened. Governments wish to know, perhaps need to know, what 
Europe's reactions are going to be before they take their own 
decisions. They may also seek to influence European policy in 
their own interests, or at least ensure that their interests have 
not been ignored or overlooked. The largely ad hoc development of 
relations between EPC and other governments is well drawn out in 
Elfriede Regelsberger's paper. But, as Regelsberger also makes 




























































































role is clearly recognized as complementary or supplementary to 
that of the Member States.
Such a role points to the conclusion that Political 
Cooperation's impact has necessarily been limited. The criticism 
has often been made that not only is European policy reactive, it 
has also been confined largely to declarations of an agreed 
position. Action, in other words, has been singularly lacking; 
the instruments of international intercourse, of trade and aid 
etc., are either in the hands of the European Community or 
retained by the individual Member States. Such views may 
underestimate the significance of mutual consultations and 
cooperation both among the Ten and with third countries, whether 
on a daily or frequent and fairly informal basis or in more 
elaborate set-piece meetings. The impact of voices frequently 
heard in harmony if not in unison can be highly significant.
Nonetheless, the extent of the Ten's unity and cooperation 
can be overestimated; the limits to consensus have too often been 
revealed. The reluctance of Greece, Ireland and Denmark to go 
beyond the vague wording of the London Report, that discussions 
will take place only on the 'economic and political aspects of 
security', indicates the limits of agreement. The sometimes 
highly individualistic policies of the Greek Government on other 




























































































Two new Member States will also soon need to be absorbed.
Although their policies have increasingly converged with those of 
the Ten, their accession to the Community and EPC will exacerbate 
a number of more practical problems: the burdens on the
Presidency have already become onerous; the timetables of Foreign 
Ministers are already over-crowded. Circumstances are not 
particularly propitious for further developments.
And yet, as both Philippe de Schoutheete and Simon Nuttall 
suggest, there is room for optimism. Even if the scope of EPC 
discussions is not broadened dramatically in the immediate future, 
many improvements can be made to Political Cooperation's 
infrastructure; for example, the establishment of a secretariat, 
closer coordination of EPC and Community procedures and 
instruments, and closer relations with third countries.
Discussions on institutional reforms may appear to be yet another 
example of Europe side-stepping the real issues that confront it. 
However, the increasing debate over the framework within which the 
institutions might operate could prove of fundamental importance 
to the construction of Europe. The concept of 'variable 
geometry', of different but interconnected constellations of 
European states, has been discussed with growing seriousness. 
Indeed, the decision of seven Member States to revive the Western 




























































































closely on defence issues may prove to be a significant harbinger 
of such changes.
Pragmatism, however, rather than sudden, radical change, has 
been the hallmark of European Political Cooperation so far. "More 
of the same" may be an unexciting prophesy; nonetheless it holds 
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